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Abstract: In this paper, we develop a multicommunity model where public mixed finance 
and private schools coexist. Students are differentiated by income, ability and social capital. 
Schools maximize their profits under a quality constraint; the pricing function is dependent on 
the cost of producing education and on the position of an individual relatively to mean ability 
and mean social capital. Income plays an indirect role since it determines the type of schools 
and communities that can be afforded by a student given his ability and social capital. 
 
Three dimensional stratification results from schools’ profit maximization and individuals’ 
utility maximization. We study majority voting over tax rates; property tax is used to finance 
education not only in pure public schools but also in mixed finance schools. We provide the 
necessary conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the 
median voter. Finally, we analyze the consequences of introducing public school choice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
    Achieving social mixity, reducing inequalities in the access to education and in its 
outcomes has become a major preoccupation of educational reforms in most developed 
countries. Recent studies proved the existence of large disparities in the outcomes of 
education in most western countries. For instance in PISA 2000; Germany, the UK, the USA 
and France turned out to have a large students’ dispersion of achievements over reading, 
numeracy, and basic science tests combined with low performances.1 The recent French 
presidential elections triggered a vigorous debate on the quality of education in France. 
Particularly, the debate on the abolishment of residence requirements and the introduction of 
public school choice made the headlines in most French newspapers. For example, Le Monde 
titled (16 September 2006) “Residence requirements have become the instrument of social 
segregation”, Libération titled (06 September 2006) “General offensive against school 
districts”, and Le Figaro titled (03 January 2007) “The incoming reform of school districts”. 
 
As of September 2007 France will be experimenting new procedures in some school districts.  
Increased autonomy will be granted to educational institutions in order to increase 
educational quality, and residence requirements will be progressively abolished in order to 
grant parents more authority over the choice of the public school for their children. More 
precisely, the government announced that more students will be able to choose their public 
schools, and priority will be given to highly performing students. 
 
The objective behind the abolishment of school districts is the reduction of social inequalities 
in the access to education. Not only highly advantaged households will be able to bypass 
school districts through the choice of private schools, but also ordinary students with high 
abilities will be able to choose their public school. It shall be said that in France students 
have the right to choose private schools outside their school district. Thus, sufficiently rich 
households have been able to bypass school districts; as a consequence segregation problems 
arose in poorer communities. 
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1
 Chapter 5 in “Education, Equality and Social Cohesion” by Green, Preston and Janmatt provides interesting 
results on outcomes’ inequalities in five groups of countries: East Asia, the Nordic countries, the Germanic 
region, the Mediterranean countries and the predominantly English speaking countries. Also an article of Fuchs 
and Wobmann (March 2004) accounted for the low performances made by these countries.    
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In this theoretical paper, we construct a multicommunity model in an economy where 
private, mixed finance and public schools coexist. We analyze the formation of communities 
when education is a locally provided good with decentralized finance. The interaction 
between students’ utility maximization and schools’ profit maximization leads to equilibrium 
on the market for schooling and that for housing and then to stratification across schools and 
communities. We study voting over tax rates, and we determine the necessary conditions for 
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the median voter. Finally, we 
analyze the effects of public school choice to find that only a small fraction of the population 
may be willing to exercise choice, we also find that some private and mixed finance schools 
will be losing students in favor of public ones, and that public school choice may not 
necessary have a negative effect on public school quality. 
 
Yoram Barzel (1973), in a critical study of Robin Barlow (1970) introduced what is known 
as the “Ends against the middle phenomenon” in the provision of public goods when private 
alternatives coexist. The study of Barzel and that of Stiglitz (1974) constituted the starting 
point for a more formalized approach to school choice. Six major articles are relevant to our 
analysis. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), in which education is a locally, publicly provided 
good and where we have a strict hierarchy of communities following educational qualities, 
and a complete stratification by income. Epple and Platt (1996) in which the authors 
construct an equilibrium in a multicommunity model where individuals have the choice 
between communities differentiated by housing prices and grant levels. Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1998), in which the authors construct a model of the provision of education 
when both public and private alternatives coexist while analyzing majority voting over tax 
rates. Epple and Romano (2000), where the authors analyze the equilibrium on the market of 
education in a multicommunity environment only with public schools, they study public 
school choice and finance decentralization. Epple and Romano (1998 and 2006) where they 
study stratification across the market for education with individuals differentiated by income 
and ability. 
 
Relatively to Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), education can be supplied privately; as a 
consequence preferences are no longer single peaked, this has major effects on majority 
voting. In our model each community may contain a different number of public, mixed 
finance and private schools with different qualities. Our stratification is three dimensional 
allowing mixity according to income, ability and social capital, while their model has a 
complete stratification by income with communities having a single public school. 
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Relatively to Epple and Platt (1996), we construct a multicommunity model of the provision 
of education where students are differentiated by income, ability, and social capital. Students 
have to choose between public, private and mixed finance schools, the chosen school must 
not necessary belong to the chosen community. Housing prices, tuition, and transportation 
costs play a major role in the stratification of individuals across communities and schools. 
Students will be stratified according to their endowments in income, ability, and social 
capital.  
  
In relation to the article of Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), we are studying majority voting in 
a multicommunity model with decentralized finance, education is a locally provided good. 
The level of rental in a community determines the quality of the school that can be attended. 
Students choosing a private school or a school outside their community have a decreasing 
utility in the tax rate. At very high tax rates some students will be willing to migrate. 
Majority equilibrium determined by the median voter would not occur unless some 
conditions are verified. 
 
In comparison with Epple and Romano (2000), we allow the coexistence of private, public 
and mixed finance schools; thus preferences are not single peaked. Complete stratification by 
income does not occur. In our model we analyze the effect of introducing public school 
choice on the already existing equilibrium, while in their model they construct equilibrium 
with choice taken as a factor in its construction. Also, we find that choice may not necessary 
have a negative effect on educational quality. Similarly to Epple and Romano (1998) and 
2006), the private sector is active, schools maximize profit under a quality constraint, and a 
discriminating pricing strategy is applied and is dependent on individuals’ ability and social 
capital. However, we allow the existence of public, mixed finance and private schools in a 
multicommunity environment. Educational quality is three dimensional, students are 
stratified into communities and schools, and tax rates are chosen through majority voting.  
 
Section II presents the model, section III presents schools’ characteristics and profit 
maximization, section IV presents the characteristics of students and examines stratification 
across schools and communities, Section V analyses majority voting over tax rates, section 
VI introduces public school choice, and finally, section VII concluded. Mathematical details 
are found in the appendix. 
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II. THE MODEL. 
 
In our model, we consider an economy populated with a continuum of households 
differentiated by income, ability and social capital; each household has one student. Social 
capital is defined to include the channels through which student acquisitions are affected by 
the social mix in their schools, these channels may include: social origins, the belonging to a 
professional class, the set of attitudes and mental dispositions governing different subjects like 
the superiority of the educational good. All these forms of social capital are represented 
through a single parameter, k. Individuals have identical preferences over private 
consumption. An individual i (with i = 1, 2, 3, 4,…,P) has an income iy , an ability ib and a 
social capital ik . Note that i may designate a particular student or a type of students with the 
same combination of y, b, and k. These students live in communities, a community is 
designated by an index C with (C = 1, 2, 3,…, C). 
 
Income, ability, and social capital are distributed in the population according to ),,( kybf  
which is positive and continuous on its support ),0(),0(),0( maxmaxmax kybS ××= . 
 
Individual utility is assumed to be a function of private consumption and school quality. It is 
noted as ),( qcU ; U is continuous, twice differentiable, and increasing in both arguments. We 
assume that ( ) 0,lim =
+∞→
qcUc
c
. 
 
School quality is determined by expenditure per pupil, peer group effect, and neighborhood 
effect. Quality is increasing in peer effect, and the expenditure per pupil; while it is decreasing 
in neighborhood effect2. Peer group effects are defined to be mean ability in a school; 
neighborhood effects are defined to be mean social capital in a school. A school is designated 
by an index j (with j=1, 2, 3,…, j). 
 
Increasing quality in expenditure per pupil and in peer effect is consistent with the theoretical 
literature on the subject. Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson (1978), Sorensen and 
Hallinan (1986) and Kulik (1992) provided evidence that peer effects exist. 
 
                                               
2
 Schools value diversity in term of social capital of their students. 
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Neighborhood effects are taken into account to shed the light on how school quality is 
affected by the social mix of enrolled students. Evidence from France, the USA, and other 
countries suggests that in order to make access to education more democratic, schools prefer a 
low level of mean social capital.3 
 
The cost of housing in a community is given by the price of housing Cr multiplied by the 
number of unites of housing demanded H. Cr  is the gross of tax price of 
housing; net
C
rtr )1( += . Land is homogenous, and the amount of land may vary across 
communities. In this model we do not make a difference between renters and owners, we 
neglect the fact that owners may achieve a capital gain or loss from selling their house. We 
also neglect the existence of owners who receive the rent. All individuals pay their taxes even 
if they do not use public and mixed finance schools. 
 
We consider that students face a transportation cost determined by the distance separating a 
student’s community from his school. It is noted CjT . CjT is equal to zero for a school j 
geographically belonging to community C. For two schools geographically belonging to the 
same community, the transportation cost between these schools and another community is the 
same, Cj
C
j TT ′= with j and j′ two schools belonging to the same community and (C = 1, 2, 
3,…, C). 
  
Note that the number of students is larger than the number of schools and the latter is larger 
than the number of communities. CjP >> . Students can only be enrolled in one school, and 
they can not supplement this education elsewhere. 
 
The proportion of students of type ( )kyb ,,  in a particular school j is given by ),,( kybjα ; the 
number of students in school j is given by jl .With: 
∫∫∫=
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(α         (1) 
And [ ]1,0),,( ∈kybjα  
 
 
                                               
3
 In France two types of scholarships are attributed to students, one is meritorious and is administered by the 
French ministry of education and the second is need based and is administered by the CROUS, in the latter case 
the scholarship is calculated using household socioeconomic data. 
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The proportion of students of type ( )kyb ,,  in a particular community is given by ),,( kybCα ; 
the number of students is given by: 
∫∫∫=
s
CC dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(α        (2) 
And [ ]1,0),,( ∈kybCα  
The production cost of education is dependent on the number of students enrolled in the 
school, it is given by FlnlnFlVlCo jjjj ++=+=
2
21)()( . 0>′V , 0>′′V , F is a fixed cost, 
1n and 2n are positive constants
4
. The absence of economies of scale in the production of 
education means that a large number of schools exist and will be catering to each type of 
students. 
 
In this model, we suppose that information is complete; individuals and schools make their 
decisions while having all information about educational quality, pricing, rental, tax rates and 
the distribution of income, ability and social capital. 
 
III. SCHOOLS. 
 
In our model, schools are assumed to maximize profit under a quality constraint. Funding is 
provided by three major sources; government subsidies, tuition paid by students and other 
earnings. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i
s
jij
s
jijj GdbdydkkybfkybpdbdydkkybfkybER ++= ∫∫∫∫∫∫ ,,,,,,,, αα  
ijE : Local government per student subsidies in school j. 
ijp : Tuition paid by student i in school j. 
jG : Other earnings. 
 
The government local subsidies in community C for school j are given by ∑= ijCj EE . The 
sum of government subsidies in a community C is equal to the sum of: the property tax rate in 
                                               
4
 Contradicting evidence was provided by Lawrence Kenny, Ferris and West on the existence of economies of 
scale in the production of education. Kenny (1982) provided evidence that such economies of scale do exist. 
However, Ferris and West (2004) argued that large schools suffer from social problems; in other terms, external 
and invisible costs prevent the existence of economies of scale.  
 8 
community C multiplied by the net of tax price of housing and by the number of housing units 
demanded inet
CC
j HrtE∑ ∑= .  
 
School quality is then given by:  








Ο= jj
j
j
jj l
R
qq ,,θ          (3) 
jq  is increasing in j
j
j
l
R θ, , while it is decreasing in jΟ .  
With: 
Expenditure per pupil given by
j
j
l
R
. 
Peer group effect given by mean ability in a school: 
( ) ( )∫∫∫=
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybbl ,,,,
1
αθ       (4) 
Neighborhood effect given by mean social capital in a school: 
( ) ( )∫∫∫=Ο
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybkl ,,,,
1
α       (5) 
 
Optimization: 
 
Schools maximize profit under a quality constraint; the level of quality chosen by a school 
and the level of local subsidies determine the price for each type of students. Schools do not 
select directly their students; they admit any student who is able to pay the price 
corresponding to his type; displaying a prohibitive price is equivalent to refusing to admit a 
student. The constraints include: mean ability, mean social capital, and the number of 
students jl  enrolled in a school since it influences expenditure per pupil. Mathematical details 
are found in the appendix. 
 
The optimal level of resources is the following5: 
)()(2 21* ijijj kblnnR −Ο′′+−′++=′ µθµ        (6) 
µµ ′′′ and, are the Lagrangian multipliers.      (7) 
                                               
5
 Results (6) and (7) are obtained by forming a Lagrangian function under the constraints (1), (4), and (5), and 
optimizing over jα . 
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( ) ( )∫∫∫ ∂
′∂
=′
s
j
jj
dbdydkkybfkybR
l
,,,,
1 *
α
θ
µ  
( ) ( )∫∫∫ Ο∂
′∂
=′′
s
j
jj
dbdydkkybfkybR
l
,,,,
1 *
αµ  
µ′ is positive and µ ′′ is negative.6 µ′ represents the per student resources change deriving 
from a change in jθ ; µ ′′ represents the per student resources change deriving from a change 
in jΟ .For analytical convenience, they are considered to be the same for all schools. 
 
When *R′ is replaced by its value we obtain the following equation: 
 
For pure private schools, we have: 
)()(2 21* ijijjij kblnnp −Ο′′+−′++= µθµ  With 0=ijE .7 
 
For mixed finance schools, we have: 
)()(2 21* ijijjijij kblnnEp −Ο′′+−′+++−= µθµ  
The level of per student subsidies ijE  for mixed finance schools is determined by authorities 
and not by optimization, schools can only choose the level of pricing to apply conditioned by 
its level of quality and the type of students it will enroll. 
 
For pure public schools, we have: 
)()(2 21* ijijjij kblnnE −Ο′′+−′++= µθµ  With 0=ijp  for all i. 
Since pure public schools are free entry free of tuition schools, the type of students enrolled in 
pure public schools determines his marginal cost and thus the amount of subsidies needed. 
Thus E is noted with an asterisk, since it is determined by the optimization.  
 
After optimization, profit is equal to zero, 0=jpi . New entries on the market of education are 
possible as long as 0>jpi . When 0=jpi , no new entries are possible.  
 
                                               
6
 See the definition of Lagrangian multipliers in Epple and Romano (1998) pp. 40. 
7
 Pricing is made according to the marginal cost of admitting a student of a particular type. 
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In this equation, *R′ represents the resources needed to cover the marginal cost of admitting a 
student. The first term jlnn 21 2+ is the part of the marginal cost resulting from the cost of 
producing education. It is identical for all students in the same school. 
 
The second term, )( ij b−′ θµ represents the cost of one’s ability on mean ability. Students with 
ij b<θ have a negative externality cost on the school. The reverse is true for ij b>θ . 
 
The third term, )( ij k−Ο′′µ represents the cost of one’s social capital on mean social capital. 
Students with jik Ο< have a negative externality cost on the school. The reverse is true for 
jik Ο> . 
 
Equation (6) is linear in ability and in social capital. For private and mixed finance schools, 
the price is decreasing in ability and increasing in social capital. For public schools, since the 
price is equal to zero, the ability and social capital of students would not have any effect on 
their disposable income but they would have an effect on the resources needed to cover the 
marginal cost of admitting them; ijE is decreasing in ability and increasing in social capital. 
 
This equation allows us to overcome the strict distinction between public and private schools. 
Different types of education finance can be considered: we can start at the level of free of 
tuition public schools with 0=ijp for all i, and go through mixed finance schools where both 
p and E are positive until reaching purely private schools where 0=ijE . 
 
Note that given the level of government subsidies; pricing will be both meritorious and need 
based. The second term of the equation represents the meritorious part of the pricing function; 
the third term of the equation represents the need based part. Another implication of equation 
(6) is the possibility that pricing can be negative depending on the level of government 
subsidies and the positioning of individual ability and social capital relatively to the means; in 
this case the negative price represents a scholarship. 
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The sequencing of decision making for individuals and schools. 
 
The sequencing of decisions can be described through a multistage game. First, individuals 
choose the community in which to reside and the school to be enrolled into8. At this level the 
housing units demanded per household are determined. Second, individuals choose the 
property tax rate through majority voting. At this level the sum of subsidies in the 
community inet
CC
j HrtE∑ ∑= is determined. Thirdly, local authorities allocate their budget. 
At this level, it should be noted that we have three types of schools, pure publicly financed 
schools with 0=ijp , mixed finance, and pure private schools with 0≠ijp . Local authorities 
attribute subsidies to pure publicly financed schools first and according to their needs, and 
then the rest of the funding is arbitrarily attributed to mixed finance schools. In other words, 
the type of students enrolled in pure public schools determines the funding needed, in this 
way these schools are free entry free of tuition schools, they admit all comers without any 
restriction. Causality in equation (6) goes from the right hand side to the left hand side; the 
marginal cost resulting from the type of students enrolled determines the funding allocated by 
local authorities. In mixed finance schools, the explanation is a little bit different; after 
receiving local subsidies and choosing the level of educational quality, schools determine the 
type of students to be admitted and the pricing that goes with it. Private and mixed finance 
schools do not have a restriction on the number of admitted students; they admit any student 
as long as he can pay the price corresponding to his type. Our model has a single period, no 
real time elapses between stages. 
 
Lemma 1:  
(i) Educational quality jq is strictly increasing in the general cost of acquiring education for 
the same student. The general cost of acquiring education is equal to the sum of the price and 
the transportation cost for the same i (With i = 1, 2, 3, …, P). In this lemma, we show that in 
order to justify the existence of a higher cost of education a higher educational quality should 
be associated with it. 
 
(ii) In each community, schools with 0=ijp  are the lowest quality schools. 
In the second part we show that, in each community, pure public schools have the lowest 
quality. 
 
                                               
8
 Complete and perfect information plays an important role in the decision making of individuals and schools.   
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Proposition 1: The hierarchy of educational qualities in the economy follows that of 
educational costs (price + transportation cost). The hierarchy of educational qualities in the 
same community follows that of the prices. The proof for this proposition follows directly 
from lemma 1. Note that at equilibrium, some mixed finance schools may have higher 
qualities than some private ones; in this case these mixed finance schools shall have higher 
educational costs for all students and all communities. 
 
IV. STUDENTS. 
 
Individuals have two connected optimization problems; they have to choose a community and 
a school. They choose communities and schools simultaneously through utility maximization. 
It should be noted that since public, mixed finance and private schools exist in our model, 
individuals have a large set of choices, even outside their community. We have two cases; 
firstly, when public school choice is not allowed, individuals have a choice between the 
schools of their community and the mixed finance and private schools outside their 
community. Secondly, when public school choice is allowed, individuals have a choice 
between all schools in the economy. For sections II to VI, public school choice is not allowed; 
it is introduced only in section VII. The cost of transportation combined with educational 
pricing and rental, play an important role in determining the affordable schools.  
 
The budget constraint is given by: i
C
ij
C
ji HrpTcy +++=    (8)9 
Maximization of U subject to constraint (8) yields the indirect utility function: 
 
[ ]jiCijCCjiiiCij
jj
j
j
ji
C
ij
C
ji
qHrptTkbyW
l
R
qHrpTyMaxqcU
,,,,,),,,(
),,(,),(*
=








Ο−−−= θ
    (9) 
 
Assumption 1: pining down preferences over education and housing.  
 
a- We assume a positive ( )kyb ,,  elasticity of the demand for educational quality. As ( )kyb ,,  
increases, the educational quality jq demanded increases. Higher ( )kyb ,,  prefer higher quality 
schools. 
 
                                               
9
 Notation remark: small letter c is used to denote consumption, capital letter C is used to denote a community. 
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b- We assume a positive ability, income, and social capital elasticity of housing demand such 
as: 0>
∂
∂
y
H
, 0>
∂
∂
b
H
, and 0>
∂
∂
k
H
. Housing demand is also assumed to be increasing 
in ( )kyb ,, such as: ( ) 0,, >∂
∂
kyb
H
. Higher ( )kyb ,,  prefer larger houses. The case for 
higher ( )kyb ,,  shall be considered because it accounts for situations where one or two of the 
variables b, y, or k is lower while others are higher. 
 
Remark: The superiority of a combination ( )kyb ,, relatively to another one depends on how b, y, and k enter the 
utility function. It should be said that any ( )kyb ,, combination mentioned in this paper is not unique since b, y 
and k are substitutable in the pricing function (low ability or high social capital can be substituted by high 
income). Different types of students with different combinations of ( )kyb ,,  may have the same level of utility. 
 
Property 1: By virtue of the implicit function theorem, we obtain: 
a- 
( )
021111 >+=++=
∂∂
∂∂
−
∂∂
∂∂
−
∂∂
∂∂
−
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂+∂+∂
=
∂
++∂
=
HHTW
qW
pW
qW
rW
qW
q
T
q
p
q
r
q
Tpr
q
Tpr
WW
 
Part a implies that indifference curves in the ( )[ ]Tprq ++,  plane have positive slopes10. 
 
We are using the ( )[ ]Tprq ++,  plane since community choice is not independent from school 
choice; the type of community chosen determines the type of schools that can be afforded, 
and the reverse is true. 
 
b- ( ) 02 <−=∂





∂
++∂∂
H
H
y
q
Tpr y
 
For students of the same ability and social capital, any indifference curve in the ( )[ ]Tprq ++,  
plane of a higher income student cuts any indifference curve of a lower income student from 
above. Thus for a given b and k, indifference curves exhibit single crossing in income. In 
other words, when income increases, the slope of the indifference curve decreases. 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 This part of the assumption means that for a higher educational quality, individuals are willing to spend more 
on rental, education, and transportation combined. 
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c- 
( ) 02 <−=∂





∂
++∂∂
H
Hb
q
Tpr b
 
For students of the same income and social capital, any indifference curve in the  
( )[ ]Tprq ++,
 plane of a higher ability student cuts any indifference curve of a lower ability 
student from above. Thus for a given y and k, indifference curves exhibit single crossing in 
ability. In other words, when ability increases, the slope of the indifference curve decreases. 
d- ( ) 02 <−=∂





∂
++∂∂
H
Hk
q
Tpr k
 
For students of the same income and ability, any indifference curve in the ( )[ ]Tprq ++,  
plane of a higher social capital student cuts any indifference curve of a lower social capital 
student from above. Thus for a given b and k, indifference curves exhibit single crossing in 
social capital. In other words, when social capital increases, the slope of the indifference 
curve decreases. 
e- 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, 2,, <−=∂





∂
++∂∂
H
H
kyb
q
Tpr kyb
 
Any indifference curve in the ( )[ ]Tprq ++,  plane of an individual with a higher combination 
of ( )kyb ,,  cuts any indifference curve of a student with a lower combination of ( )kyb ,,  from 
above. Thus, indifference curves exhibit single crossing in ( )kyb ,, . In other words, 
when ( )kyb ,,  increases, the slope of the indifference curve decreases. 
 
Lemma 2: Community and school choice: boundary indifference. 
For 1+< CC rr , and 
'jj qq >  there exists a combination ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ such that: 
( ){ } ( ){ }
'
1
'
11
'
1
'
,,,,,,
ˆ
,
ˆ
,ˆ,,,,,,
ˆ
,
ˆ
,ˆ ji
C
ij
CC
jiii
C
ijji
C
ij
CC
jiii
C
ij qHrptTkbyWqHrptTkbyW ++++=  (11) 
With CC ≠+1 and jj ′≠ . Note that ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ is not unique.11 
j  and j′may or may not belong to communities C  and 1+C . 
 
Students choose a community and a school, as long as their indirect utility is higher than that 
obtained in any other combination of communities and schools. 
 
                                               
11
 ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  is not unique, any other equivalent combination of b , y and k can determine the boundary 
indifference. See the remark on page 13. 
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In this Lemma we show that by choosing lower rental communities, higher ),,( kyb students 
would have higher numeraire consumption, higher school quality while having no less 
housing consumption relatively to choosing higher rental communities. Continuity of utility 
and of the distribution function of ),,( kyb  ensures that there is a type of individuals that is 
indifferent between each two combinations of communities and schools. 
 
Corollary 1: ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  is strictly monotonically decreasing in b, y, k, and (b, y, k) C∀ . 
In this corollary, we show that any student with a better combination than ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  can not be 
indifferent between the two communities C and C+1. 
 
 
Lemma 3: (i) Students with higher combinations of ( )kyb ,,  spend more on rental, schooling, 
and transportation combined ( )Tpr ++  and choose higher educational qualities. (ii) 
Higher ( )kyb ,,  students spend less on rental, and they have a higher housing consumption. 
(iii) In the third part of this Lemma we examine individuals’ spending on transportation and 
education. 
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Proposition 2: Three dimensional stratification. Consider the same two students from Lemma 
3. Student ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ is indifferent between these two combinations ( )',1 jC +  and ( )jC, ; while 
student ( )111 ,, kyb  is indifferent between these two combinations ( )jC,  and ( )jC ′′− ,1 . 
Equilibrium exists if ( ) Ckyb ∈,, when ( ) ( ) ( )111 ,,,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ kybkybkyb << . 
 
By virtue of proposition 2, and corollary 1(Boundary Loci are strictly monotonically 
decreasing in b, y, k, and ( )kyb ,, ), students are stratified into communities and schools 
according to their ability, income, and social capital. In other words, complete stratification by 
ability, income, or social capital would not occur. Thus, we will have a mixture of individuals 
with different combinations of ( )kyb ,, in each community. 
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V. MAJORITY VOTING. 
 
In this part of our model we focus on individuals’ choice of tax rates. For the rest of the paper, 
tax rates are considered to be endogenous through majority voting. Tax rates influence 
educational quality through local expenditure CjE . Students have perfect knowledge of tax 
rates and school qualities; they anticipate any changes in educational qualities as a result of a 
change in the tax rate in their community; they assume that tax rates and educational qualities 
in other communities are fixed. 
 
In our model, we considered three types of schools, pure public schools, mixed finance, and 
private schools. In each community, for very low tax rates the quality of public and mixed 
finance schools is low, students prefer private schools or even schools (private or mixed 
finance) outside their community. A marginal increase in tax rates will not increase public 
school quality that much, but it will reduce numeraire consumption and utility; private schools 
and schools outside the community are still preferred; at this stage students will not migrate 
from their community because they anticipate an increase in utility when the tax rate becomes 
sufficiently high. An important increase of the tax rate induces an important increase of 
quality in public and mixed finance schools; at some level of the tax rate, students are willing 
to move from their private school (or schools outside their community) to a mixed finance 
school inside the community, their utility increases until reaching its maximum for this 
school; at this point, the student will move again to the following mixed finance school, and 
so on. This process continues until the tax rate is high enough to encourage students to get 
enrolled in a public school, utility increases until reaching its highest level, from this point on, 
any increase in tax rates induces a decrease in utility. Once the tax rate becomes excessive 
such as the gross of tax price of housing is very high, students anticipate that any further 
increase in the tax rate will just decrease their utility more and more; high ( )kyb ,, students 
migrate from this community. Note that preferences are not single peaked, and that the “Ends 
against the Middle” phenomenon is present in our model. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Remark: students enrolled in a school (private or mixed finance) outside their community or a private school 
inside their community have a decreasing utility in the tax rate since they do not use public or mixed finance 
schools inside their community. Private schools’ qualities are independent of the tax rate since 0=CjE , mixed 
finance schools’ qualities are independent of tax rates of communities to which they do not belong. 
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We define Citˆ to be the tax rate at which student i is indifferent between a private school or a 
school (private or mixed) outside his community and a mixed finance school inside his 
community; note that student i lives in community C. We also define Cit  to be the tax rate at 
which the utility of student i is maximized in the public school, and finally Cit
)
 the tax rate at 
which student i is willing to migrate from community C. i=m is used to designate the student 
with the median combination of ( )kyb ,, . Note that students are not willing to migrate at Citˆ  
because they anticipate an increase in utility when the tax rate becomes sufficiently high, 
conversely they are willing to migrate after Cit
) because any further increase of the tax rate will 
reduce their disposable income and their utility. 
 
Conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium: 
 
1- Students with the median combination of ability, income, and social capital ( )
m
kyb ,,  
prefer a positive tax rate in a public school (noted c) over a zero tax rate in a private 
one or a school outside his community (noted a). Note that ( )
m
kyb ,,  is not unique.12 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, > is true. 
0=CcT , while 
C
aT may be different than zero. 
                                               
12
 See the remark on page 13. 
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2- As seen in figure 3, all students with ( ) ( )
miii kybkyb ,,,, > have a migration tax rate
C
it
)
 
higher than Cmt  ( Cmt is the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the student with 
( )
m
kyb ,, in the public school). 
3-  As seen in figure 3, Cit is decreasing in the combination ( )kyb ,, . 
4- If two students 1 and 2 with ( ) ( )222111 ,,,, kybkyb >  are enrolled in the same school, live 
in the same community, and have the same tax rate; student 1 has a lower utility. 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]aCaCCaCaaCaCCaCa qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111222222 >  
 If they are enrolled in two different schools a and b respectively with ba qq > , then 
student 1 has a higher utility.13 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]aCaCCaCabCbCCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111222222 <  
 
If 1 is not satisfied, then 0=t is a majority voting equilibrium. If 2, 3, and 4 are not satisfied, 
then majority voting equilibrium may not exist. Restrictions on preferences alone do not allow 
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium; the following conditions represent restrictions 
on the parametric form of the utility function. For the rest of the paper we consider that these 
conditions are satisfied. 
 
Definition: if Ct is to be a majority voting equilibrium, then there is no other tax rate that is 
preferred by more than 50% of the population of the community. In other terms, at least 50% 
and one individual choose this tax rate. 
 
Lemma 4:  
(i) Citˆ is increasing in ( )kyb ,, . 
This part applies to any indifference tax rate between a private school and a mixed finance 
school, between two mixed finance schools or between a mixed finance and a public school. It 
can be explained intuitively. Higher ( )kyb ,,  students need higher tax rates and thus higher 
school qualities to be encouraged to get enrolled in a mixed finance or a public school. 
 
 (ii) We consider three schools a, b and c; a and b are two private schools belonging to 
community C or two schools (private or mixed finance) outside community C, c is a public 
school in community C. 
 
                                               
13
 Epple and Romano (1996) used an assumption about education being a superior or a normal good, they also 
used a diminishing marginal utility of numeraire consumption, see page 300. Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) 
used a similar assumption where 0),(lim =
+∞→
qcU c
c
and a homothetic utility function. 
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1- If ( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, > is true.14 
Then ( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCbCbcCcCmCcCc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111111111 >  for all 
( ) ( )
m
kybkyb ,,,, 111 < . 
2- If ( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, < is true. 
Then ( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCbCbcCcCmCcCc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111111111 <  for all 
( ) ( )
m
kybkyb ,,,, 111 > . 
 
In this part of lemma 4 we prove that if the type of students with the median combination of 
( )kyb ,,  prefers “does not prefer” a positive tax rate in a public school over a zero tax rate in a 
private one or a school outside community C, all students with lower “higher” combinations 
of  ( )kyb ,,  have the same behavior. 
 
Note that according to condition 1, the type of students with the median combination of 
( )kyb ,,  prefer the tax rate Cmt .  It will be sufficient to prove that 50% of the population prefers 
C
mt  to prove the existence of a majority voting equilibrium. The type of students with the 
median combination of ( )kyb ,,  splits the population into two identical fractions of 50%. 
 
Lemma 5: 
(i) Over the interval [ ]1,Cmt , there does not exist a tax rate different than Cmt that is preferred by 
more than 50% of the population. 
(ii) Over the interval [ ]CmCm tt ,ˆ , there does not exist a tax rate different than Cmt that is preferred by 
more than 50% of the population. 
An important property used in the proof of Lemma 5 is based on the fact that indirect utility is 
increasing in t over the interval [ ]C
m
C
m tt ,ˆ  and decreasing over the interval [ ]1,Cmt . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Note that since c is a public school 0=cp , and for schools belonging to community C, 0=T . 
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Proposition 3: 
if ( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, > is true, then Cmt is a 
majority voting equilibrium. 
 
If ( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, < is true, then all 
students with ( ) ( )
miii kybkyb ,,,, > prefer a zero tax rate in a private school over a positive tax 
rate in a public one; then 0=t  is a majority voting equilibrium. 
 
Equilibrium: 
At Equilibrium, all the following conditions are satisfied. 
1- Students. 
• Utility maximization:  
[ ]jiCijCCjiiiCij
jj
j
j
ji
C
ij
C
ji
qHrptTkbyW
l
R
qHrpTyMaxqcU
,,,,,),,,(
),,(,),(*
=








Ο−−−= θ
 
• All majority voting conditions hold in equilibrium. 
  
2- Schools. 
• Profit maximization and optimal level of resources: FlVR jjj −−= )(maxpi . 
)()(2 21* ijjijjj kblnnR −Ο′′+−′++=′ µθµ  
With µ′ is positive and µ ′′ is negative. 
 
• At equilibrium 0=jpi ; no new entries on the market are possible. 
• The number of students in a school: ∫∫∫=
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(α . 
• Mean ability in a schools: ( ) ( )∫∫∫=
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybbl ,,,,
1
αθ
 
• Mean social capital in a school: ( ) ( )∫∫∫=Ο
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybkl ,,,,
1
α . 
3- Communities. 
• The community budget is balanced: inet
CC
j HrtE∑ ∑= . 
• The number of students in a community: ∫∫∫=
s
CC dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(α . 
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• Boundary indifference conditions are satisfied. 
• The median voter is pivotal. 
 
4- Market clearance. 
• All students go to school: Pll
C
C
C
j
j
j ==∑∑
== 11
 
• The housing demand in a community is equal to the housing supply. 
 
 
VI. INTRODUCING PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE. 
 
For the rest of the paper, we suppose that all equilibrium conditions specified above are 
satisfied. We assume that public schools do not face a capacity constraint, they admit all new 
comers as seen in the sequencing of decision making on page 11. For simplicity, we are only 
considering two communities C and C+1. From lemma 2, and lemma 3; we know that 
higher ( )kyb ,,  students choose community C, while lower ( )kyb ,,  students choose 
community C+1, with 1+< CC rr . Students with ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  determine boundary indifference 
between communities. When majority voting equilibrium’s conditions are satisfied, median 
voters are pivotal; ( )C
m
kyb ,, is the median voter in community C, and ( ) 1,, +C
m
kyb  is the median 
voter in community C+1. Cmt  and
1+C
mt are majority voting equilibria in each community. We 
know from condition 1 that median voters prefer a positive tax rate ( Cmt  and 1+Cmt ) in a public 
school over a zero tax rate in a private school or a school outside their community; thus at Cmt  
and 1+Cmt , median voters choose public schools. From lemma 4 (ii), we know that all students 
with ( )kyb ,,  below that of the median make the same choice, thus they choose the public 
school. From figure 3, we can see that at Cmt  and
1+C
mt , some students with a higher 
combination of ( )kyb ,, relatively to the median voter may choose the public school; thus 
more than 50% of the population chooses the public school. Only students with very 
high ( )kyb ,,  choose mixed finance or private schools.15 
 
 
                                               
15
 This is consistent with assumption (1-a), higher ( )kyb ,, students choose higher quality schools. 
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According to lemma 1 (ii), and proposition 1, in the same community, the hierarchy of school 
qualities follows that of the prices for the same student; thus public schools have the lowest 
quality in each community. By virtue of assumption (1-a), students with ( ) ( )kybkyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,, >  
prefer higher educational qualities than students with ( ) ( )kybkyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,, < ;16 Thus all schools in 
community C have higher qualities than schools in community C+1. Figure 4 presents a 
simplifying illustration. 
 
Figure 4 represents stratification across communities and schools. 
 
When public school choice is allowed, students from C+1 will try to get enrolled in the 
public school of community C. Since students have already chosen their community, no one 
would be willing to change his residence after the introduction of public school choice. At 
equilibrium, those who have chosen the public school in community C+1 have their budget 
already balanced; the introduction of public school choice would not have any effect on them 
since they are unable to afford transportation to get enrolled in the public school in 
community C. Only those who are enrolled in private and mixed finance schools in C+1 
would be able to get enrolled in the public school of community C by using the resources 
economized on the cost of education to finance transportation. Note that the students enrolled 
in private and mixed finance schools in community C+1 are the ones with high ( )kyb ,, , thus 
the most advantaged in their community. 
 
 
                                               
16
 The demand for educational quality is increasing in ( )kyb ,, . 
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Consider a student i living in community C+1 and enrolled in a private or mixed finance 
school (inside or outside C+1) noted (a). If he is to exercise public school choice, he would 
be still living in community C+1 but will get enrolled in the public school in community C 
noted (c). With ac qq ≥  (this is a necessary condition, since no student would be encouraged 
to get enrolled in c if it has a lower quality) this is consistent with ( ) 0,lim =
+∞→
qcU c
c
. 
His budget constraint in (a) is the following: iCiaCaiCia HrpTyc 111 +++ −−−=  with 01 =+CaT if 
1+∈Ca  and 01 ≠+CaT if 1+∉Ca . 
His budget constraint in (c) is the following: iCCciCic HrTyc 111 +++ −−=  with 0=icp since c is 
a public school, and 01 ≠+CcT because 1+∉Cc . 
In order for student i to exercise public school choice, he should achieve at least the same 
numeraire consumption while having no less educational quality. Such as: 
01111 ≥−+=− ++++ Ccia
C
a
C
ia
C
ic TpTcc  is true; this implies: 
11 ++ ≥+ Ccia
C
a TpT . In order to exercise 
public school choice, the transportation cost between a student’s community and his new 
public school must not exceed the economies made by opting out of his old private or mixed 
finance school. 
 
As a result, we can see that public school choice may be beneficial only to a small fraction of 
the population and that only high ( )kyb ,,  students would be able to exercise their right to 
choose their public school. The first of these results is perhaps the most novel; it is consistent 
with the fact that in some countries like the UK, New Zealand, Sweden, and Ireland a large 
fraction of households still choose the public school of their neighborhood even if they have 
the choice to opt out. The final effect on school quality in both communities is ambiguous; 
while public school quality in community C+1 would remain unchanged, some private 
schools in community C+1 would be losing students, and expenditure per pupil in the public 
school in community C will be reduced since the number of students is growing while 
resources are unchanged. Since boundary loci are decreasing between communities, and thus 
there are no complete stratification according to one of these factors: ability, income, or 
social capital; it is difficult to determine the effect of public school choice on mean ability 
and mean social capital, it is not certain that choice may have a general negative effect on the 
three components of educational quality. These results can be generalized to an economy 
consisting of more than two communities. 
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VII. CONCLUSION. 
 
In this paper, we have constructed an equilibrium on the market of education in a 
multicommunity environment where students are differentiated by income, ability, and social 
capital. We have analyzed stratification across schools and communities to find that students 
with higher combinations of ability, income, and social capital spend more on rental, 
transportation and education combined, while choosing higher educational qualities; they 
spend less on rental and more on the general cost of acquiring education while having higher 
housing consumption. 
 
We have studied majority voting over tax rates; the presence of private, mixed finance, and 
public schools led to the existence of non single peaked preferences. We have provided the 
necessary conditions for a majority voting equilibrium to be determined by the median voter. 
In the final section, we have introduced public school choice to find that only a small fraction 
of the most advantaged students in term of income, ability, and social capital will exercise 
their right to choose a public school outside their community; we also found that choice may 
not have the dramatic negative effect on school quality feared by some critics of choice. 
 
Appendix 
 
School optimization: 
Schools maximize profit under constraint:  
FlVR jjj −−= )(maxpi  
Under these constraints: 
∫∫∫=
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(α        (1) 
( ) ( )∫∫∫=
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybbl ,,,,
1
αθ       (4) 
( ) ( )∫∫∫=Ο
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybkl ,,,,
1
α       (5) 
With (i = 1, 2, 3, …, P) and (j = 1, 2, 3, …, j) 
 
These constraints can be transformed in the following way: 
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1- ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,,,,,, =− ∫∫∫∫∫∫
s
ji
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybbdbdydkkybfkyb ααθ  
2- ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,,,,,, =−Ο ∫∫∫ ∫∫∫
s s
jijj dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb αα  
The Lagrangian function is of the following form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ],,,,,,,,[
],,,,,,,,[221
∫∫∫ ∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫∫∫
−Ο′′−
−
′
−−−−=Φ
s s
jijj
s
ji
s
jjjjj
dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb
dbdydkkybfkybbdbdydkkybfkybFlnlnR
ααµ
ααθµ
With µµ ′′′ and, the Lagrangian multipliers. 
µ′ is positive and µ ′′ is negative. 
Optimization is made through the partial derivation of the Lagrangian function 
over ),,( kybjα , the following results are obtained: 
( ) 0)()(2,, 21
*
=−′′−−′−−−′=
Φ
ijijj
j
kblnnR
kybd
d
οµθµ
α
 
)()(2 21* ijijj kblnnR −′′+−′++=′ οµθµ  
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
 
(i) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that we have two schools 1 and 2 
with Ci
C
i TpTp 2211 +<+ and 21 qq ≥  (With i = 1, 2, …, P and C = 1, 2, …, C), student i lives in 
community C. In this case; rational students will choose school 1 since it has higher or equal 
quality at a lower cost for all students and all communities. No student will choose school 2; 
this school will be obliged to leave the market. In order for school 2 to exist it should have a 
quality 12 qq > . Quality is strictly increasing in the general cost of education. If two schools 
are of the same quality they should have the same costs of education.  
 
For two schools 1 and 2 belonging to the same community we know that: CC TT 21 =  (With C = 
1, 2, …, C) (see page 6); thus we can write: for 12 qq >  we have  12 ii pp > . Thus, in the same 
community, quality is increasing in the price for all students (i = 1, 2, …, P). 
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(ii) The second part of lemma 1 follows directly from the first part. Since we are considering 
schools belonging to the same community; all schools have the same transportation cost 
relatively to a community C (with C = 1, 2, …, C). Thus, educational quality is increasing in 
the price as shown above. The lowest price 0=jp  of pure public schools is associated with 
the lowest quality. An important assumption needed to the proof of this lemma is that made in 
the sequencing of decisions; since pure public schools admit all comers, no student is 
restrained to choose a lower quality higher price school than a pure public school. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
We consider a student i with ( )iii kyb ,, , he consumes the same amount of housing in both 
communities C and C+1. 
His budget constraint in school j and community C is given by: iCijCjCiji HrpTcy +++=  
It can be written in the following form:  i
C
ij
C
ji
C
ij HrpTyc −−−=  
His budget constraint in school 'j and community C+1 is given by: 
i
C
ij
C
j
C
iji HrpTcy
1
'
1
'
1
'
+++ +++= . It can be written in the following form: 
i
C
ij
C
ji
C
ij HrpTyc
1
'
1
'
1
'
+++
−−−=
 
The difference in consumption between community C+1 and C is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) iCCijijCjCjCijCij HrrppTTcc 1'1'1' +++ −+−+−=−  
The sum ( ) ( )
'
1
' ijij
C
j
C
j ppTT −+−
+ can be positive, negative, or equal to zero. By virtue of lemma 
1, if j and j′belong to the same community then 0)( >−
′jiij pp and ( )1' +− CjCj TT can be 
positive, negative or equal to zero. Since 1+< CC rr , we can write 01 <− +CC rr . 
 
Even if the distribution of ( )kyb ,, has an upper bound determined by ( )maxmaxmax ,, kyb and a 
lower bound determined by ( )0,0,0 ; it is analytically convenient for the proof of this lemma to 
consider ( ) +∞→kyb ,, and ( ) −∞→kyb ,, . 
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We have two cases:  
1- According to part b of assumption 1, for students with very high combinations of ( )kyb ,, ; 
such as ( ) +∞→kyb ,, . We have +∞→iH , and then ( ) ( ) −∞=−++∞→ CijCijkyb cc 1',, lim . 
In other terms, we can always find a ( )kyb ,, combination that is sufficiently high such 
as ( ) 01
'
<−+ Cij
C
ij cc . 
According to part a of assumption 1; higher ( )kyb ,, students prefer higher educational 
qualities. As a consequence, this student chooses school j . 
If this individual is to locate to C+1; he will consume the same amount of housing, while 
having a lower numeraire consumption. So, student ( )iii kyb ,,  strictly prefer community C. 
 
2- According to part b of assumption 1, for students with very low combinations of ( )kyb ,, ; 
such as ( ) −∞→kyb ,, . We have −∞→iH , and then ( ) ( ) +∞=−++∞→ CijCijkyb cc 1',, lim . 
In other terms, we can always find a ( )kyb ,, combination that is sufficiently low such 
as ( ) 01
'
>−+ Cij
C
ij cc . 
According to part a of assumption 1, lower ( )kyb ,, students prefer lower educational qualities. 
As a consequence, this student chooses school 'j . 
If this student is to locate to C+1; he will consume the same amount of housing, while having 
a higher consumption. So, student ( )iii kyb ,,  strictly prefer community C+1. 
 
We have seen, that high ( )kyb ,,  students prefer communities with lower rental and schools 
with higher quality, and that students with low ( )kyb ,,  prefer communities with higher rental 
and schools with lower quality. The continuity of the utility function and of the distribution 
function of ( )kyb ,,  implies that while going from an extreme to the other, there exist an 
student with ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  that is indifferent between the two communities and the two schools. The 
proof that is applied to two communities and schools can be extended to multiple 
communities and schools; between each two consecutive communities and schools there will 
be a type of students indifferent between them.  
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Proof of corollary 1: The proof is by contradiction. 
Suppose that ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  is somewhere nondecreasing in b, y, k and ( )kyb ,, . Then we can find an 
student with ),,( 111 kyb indifferent between the two combinations of communities and schools, 
( )jC,  and ( )',1 jC +  such as: 
1- bb ˆ1 > , yy ˆ1 ≥ , and kk ˆ1 ≥ .    4- bb ˆ1 > , yy ˆ1 > , and kk ˆ1 ≥  
2- bb ˆ1 ≥ , yy ˆ1 > , and kk ˆ1 ≥ .    5- bb ˆ1 > , yy ˆ1 ≥ , and kk ˆ1 >  
3- bb ˆ1 ≥ , yy ˆ1 ≥  and, kk ˆ1 >     6- bb ˆ1 ≥ , yy ˆ1 > , and kk ˆ1 >  
7- bb ˆ1 > , yy ˆ1 > , kk ˆ1 >  or ( ) ( )kybkyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,, 111 >  
 
The case where ( ) ( )kybkyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,, 111 > , shall be considered because it accounts for situations 
where one or two of the variables b, y, and k is lower while others are higher. 
 
For case 1,  
According to property 1-c, the slope of the indifference curve of )ˆ,ˆ,( 1 kyb is lower than that of 
( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to properties 1-b and 1-d, the slope of ),,( 111 kyb is equal or lower than that 
of )ˆ,ˆ,( 1 kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope )ˆ,ˆ,( 1 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
For case 2: 
According to property 1-b, the slope of the indifference curve of )ˆ,,ˆ( 1 kyb is lower than that of 
( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to properties 1-c and 1-d, the slope of the indifference curve of 
),,( 111 kyb is lower or equal to that of )ˆ,,ˆ( 1 kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope )ˆ,,ˆ( 1 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
For case 3:  
According to property 1-d, the slope of the indifference curve of ),ˆ,ˆ( 1kyb is lower than that of 
( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to properties 1-b and 1-c, the slope of the indifference curve of 
),,( 111 kyb is lower or equal to that of ),ˆ,ˆ( 1kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope ),ˆ,ˆ( 1kyb <Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
For Case 4: 
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According to properties 1-b and 1-c, the slope of the indifference curve of )ˆ,,( 11 kyb is lower 
than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to property 1-d, the slope of the indifference curve of 
),,( 111 kyb is equal or lower than that of )ˆ,,( 11 kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope )ˆ,,( 11 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
 
 
For case 5: 
According to properties 1-c and 1-d, the slope of the indifference curve of ),ˆ,( 11 kyb is lower 
than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to property 1-b, the slope of the indifference curve of 
),,( 111 kyb  is equal or lower than that of ),ˆ,( 11 kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope ),ˆ,( 11 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
For case 6: 
According to properties 1-b and 1-d, the slope of the indifference curve of ),,ˆ( 11 kyb is lower 
than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . According to property 1-c, the slope of ),,( 111 kyb is equal or lower than 
that of ),,ˆ( 11 kyb . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb ≤ Slope ),,ˆ( 11 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
For case 7: 
According to properties 1-b, 1-c, 1-d and 1-e. the slope of the indifference curve of 
),,( 111 kyb is lower than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . 
Slope ),,( 111 kyb < Slope ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
 
For a student with ),,( 111 kyb to be indifferent between the two combinations of communities 
and schools ( )jC,  and ( )',1 jC + ; his indifference curve shall pass through the two points 
( )[ ]CjijCj Tprq ++, and ( )[ ]1''1' , ++ ++ CjijCj Tprq . Thus, the slope of the indifferent curve of 
),,( 111 kyb must be at some point grater than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  in order to cross it at these two 
points. Following the 7 cases previously developed and figure 1, this is a contradiction; the 
slope of the indifference curve of ),,( 111 kyb is always smaller than that of ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ , and there is 
only one intersection between the two indifference curves. The student with ),,( 111 kyb  can not 
be indifferent between these two combinations, and the boundary loci between communities 
and schools are strictly monotonically decreasing in b, y, k, and ( )kyb ,, .  
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Proof of Lemma 3: 
 
Consider two students with ),,( 111 kyb > )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb ; according to property (1-e), the indifference 
curve of student ),,( 111 kyb has a lower slope than that of student )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb . There is only one 
intersection between their indifference curves, such that they can not be indifferent between 
the same two combinations of communities and schools. See figure 2. 
(i) Note that 11 −≠≠+ CCC and jjj ′≠≠′′ . 
We consider that student )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb  is indifferent between these two combinations ( )',1 jC +  
and ( )jC, ; his indifference curve passes through these two points ( )[ ]1
''
1
'
,
++ ++ Cjij
C
j Tprq  
and ( )[ ]CjijCj Tprq ++, . According to Lemma 2 we have: 
jj qq ′> and 1+< CC rr . 
 
We consider that student ),,( 111 kyb  is indifferent between these two combinations ( )jC,  
and ( )jC ′′− ,1 , his indifference curve passes through these two points ( )[ ]CjijCj Tprq ++, and 
( )[ ]1
''
1
,
−
′′
−
′′
++ Cjji
C
j Tprq . According to Lemma 2 we have: 
jj qq >′′  and CC rr <−1 . 
We can see that there is only one intersection of indifference curves at 
point ( )[ ]CjijCj Tprq ++, . 
From the explanation mentioned above, we can write jjj qqq ′′′ >> . From Property (1-a), we 
know that indifference curves have positive slopes in the ( )[ ]Tprq ++, plane, thus 
jjj qqq ′′′ >> implies ( ) ( ) ( )1111 +′′+−′′′′− ++>++>++ CjjiCCjijCCjjiC TprTprTpr . 
For a student with )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb choosing ( )',1 jC + , he would pay ( )11 +
′′
+ ++ Cjji
C Tpr . For a student 
with ),,( 111 kyb  choosing ( )jC, , he would pay ( )CjijC Tpr ++ . With ),,( 111 kyb > )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb , 
jj qq ′> and ( ) ( )11 +′′+ ++>++ CjjiCCjijC TprTpr , we deduce that students with a higher 
combination of ( )kyb ,,  spend more on rental, schooling, and transportation combined, while 
choosing higher quality schools. 
 
(ii) From part (i) of this Lemma we can write: 11 +− << CCC rrr . 
Higher ( )kyb ,, students spend less on rental. 
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From Assumption (1-b), we know that: ( ) 0,, >∂
∂
kyb
H
 
Thus higher ( )kyb ,, students have higher housing consumption. 
(iii) From part (i) and (ii) of this lemma we can analyze the different possible cases of 
spending on transportation and education. As in part (i), the student with )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb  
chooses ( )',1 jC + , the student with ),,( 111 kyb chooses ( )jC, , with ),,( 111 kyb > )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( kyb . 
We have 1
'
1 +
′
+ ++>++ Cjji
CC
jij
C TprTpr ,  and 1+< CC rr . 
We can write ( ) ( ) 011 <−<+−+ ++
′′
CCC
jij
C
jji rrTpTp , this implies that ( ) ( )CjijCjji TpTp +<+ +′′ 1 . 
Higher ( )kyb ,,  students spend more on education and transportation combined, in other words 
higher ( )kyb ,,  students are willing to spend more on the general cost of acquiring education in 
order to get higher qualities. We can see that price and transportation are substitutable in 
acquiring higher educational qualities. 
 
When ( )CjCj TT −+′ 1  and ( )ijji pp −′  are taken separately, they can be positive, negative, or equal 
to zero, with ( ) ( ) 01 <−+−
′
+
′ ijji
C
j
C
j ppTT satisfied. For ( ) 01 <−+′ CjCj TT ; high ( )kyb ,,  students 
choose far from school communities in comparison with lower ( )kyb ,,  students. 
For ( ) 01 >−+
′
C
j
C
j TT ; high ( )kyb ,,  students choose close to school communities in comparison 
with lower ( )kyb ,,  students. For ( ) 01 =−+
′
C
j
C
j TT ; high ( )kyb ,,  students live at the same 
distance from school in comparison with lower ( )kyb ,,  students. Similarly, For ( ) 0>−
′ ijji pp  
higher ( )kyb ,, students spend less on education than lower ( )kyb ,, students; 
For ( ) 0<−
′ ijji pp higher ( )kyb ,, students spend more on education than lower ( )kyb ,, students; 
For ( ) 0=−
′ ijji pp both types of students spend the same on education. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
From property 1, we know that the indifference curve of student ( )kyb ,, has a steeper slope 
than student ( )111 ,, kyb , since ( ) ( )111 ,,,, kybkyb < . From lemma 3, we know that he spends less 
on rental, schooling and transportation combined and chooses lower quality schools. 
Similarly, the indifference curve of student ( )kyb ,,  has a flatterer slope than student ( )kyb ˆ,ˆ,ˆ , 
since ( ) ( )kybkyb ,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ < . From lemma 3, we know that he spends more on rental, schooling and 
transportation combined and he chooses higher quality schools.  
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By virtue of Lemma 3 and figure 2, we can write. 
1
'
11
''
1 +
′
+−
′′
− ++>++>++ Cjji
CC
jij
CC
jji
C TprTprTpr and, 
jjj qqq ′′′ >>  
Thus student ( )kyb ,, satisfying ( ) ( ) ( )111 ,,,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ kybkybkyb <<  must strictly prefer the 
combination ( )jC, , with ( )[ ]CjijCj Tprq ++, . 
Proof of lemma 4:  
(i) The proof is by contradiction. 
Consider two students 1 and 2 with ( ) ( )222111 ,,,, kybkyb >  living in community C, and three 
schools a, b, and c. a and b are two private schools belonging to community C or two schools 
(private or mixed finance) outside community C with ba qq >  “See the remark on page 17”, c 
is a mixed finance school in community C .17 
 
Since higher ( )kyb ,, students choose higher educational qualities as indicated in assumption 
(1-a), student ( )111 ,, kyb chooses school a, while student ( )222 ,, kyb chooses school b. In this 
lemma we analyze the positioning of indifference tax rates of students 1 and 2 between (a and 
c) and (b and c) respectively.   
We suppose that CC tt 21 ˆˆ < is true.  
For student 1; Ct1ˆ is his indifference tax rate between a and c. we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
c
C
c
CC
c
C
ca
C
a
CC
a
C
a qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 11111111111111 =   (a) 
For student 2; Ct2ˆ is the indifference tax rate between b and c. we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCCcCcbCbCCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 22222222222222 =  
By virtue of figure 3 we know that for any Ctt 2ˆ< . Student 2 prefers school b (See Figure 3). 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCcCcbCbCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 222222222222 >  
Since we supposed that CC tt 21 ˆˆ < , we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCCcCcbCbCCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 22122222212222 >  (b) 
Since ( ) ( )222111 ,,,, kybkyb > , and by virtue condition 4 we have: 
                                               
17
 Since c is in community C, then 0=CcT , while 
C
aT and
C
bT may be different than zero. 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCCbCbaCaCCaCa qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 22122221111111 > . (c) 18 
From (a), (b) and (c), we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCCcCccCcCCcCc qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 22122221111111 > . (d) 
We know from condition 4 that if ( ) ( )222111 ,,,, kybkyb >  is true then: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
c
C
c
CC
c
C
cc
C
c
CC
c
C
c qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,ˆ,,,,,,,,ˆ,,,, 22122221111111 < . 
This is a contradiction with (d); our assumption that CC tt 21 ˆˆ < is false. This implies that the 
reverse is true: CC tt 21 ˆˆ > . Thus the indifference tax rate is increasing in the combination ( )kyb ,, . 
Note that this lemma applies to any indifference tax rate between a private school and a mixed 
finance one, between two mixed finance schools, and between a mixed finance and a public 
school. In this case, schools a and b can be private schools or mixed finance schools (inside or 
outside community C), school c can be a mixed finance or a public school inside community 
C. 
 
(ii) Consider two students m and 1 with ( )
m
kyb ,, and ( )111 ,, kyb respectively; a and b are two 
private schools belonging to community C or two schools (private or mixed finance) outside 
community C “See the remark on page 17”, c is a public school inside community C. 
According to assumption (1-a), higher ( )kyb ,,  students choose higher quality schools. 
Part 1: 
For ( ) ( )111 ,,,, kybkyb m >  and ba qq > . 
By virtue of condition 4, we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
c
C
c
C
m
C
c
C
ccm
C
mc
C
m
C
cm
C
mc qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111< .
19
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCbCbamCmaCamCma qHrpTkybWqHrpTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,0,,,, 111111> .20 
And if ( )[ ] ( )[ ]amCmaCamCmacmCmcCmCcmCmc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, >  is true 
 
We can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCmCcCccmCmcCmCcmCmc
am
C
ma
C
am
C
mab
C
b
C
b
C
b
qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW
qHrpTkybWqHrpTkybW
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,0,,,,,,,,0,,,,
111111
111111
<
<<
 
 
                                               
18
 Higher ),,( kyb students achieve higher utilities when they have access to higher educational qualities and 
lower utilities when they are enrolled in the same school and live in the same community as lower ),,( kyb  
students; this is assumed to be true in condition 4. 
19
 m and 1 are in the same public school in the same community, and have the same tax rate. 
20
 m and 1 are in two different private schools. 
 35 
Thus: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCmCcCcbCbCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrpTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,0,,,, 111111111111 <  
 
Part 2: 
For ( ) ( )111 ,,,, kybkyb m <  and ba qq < . 
By virtue of condition 4, we can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
c
C
c
C
m
C
c
C
ccm
C
mc
C
m
C
cm
C
mc qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111> . 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCbCbamCmaCamCma qHrpTkybWqHrpTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,0,,,, 111111< . 
And if ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
am
C
ma
C
am
C
macm
C
mc
C
m
C
cm
C
mc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, <  is true 
 
We can write: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCmCcCccmCmcCmCcmCmc
am
C
ma
C
am
C
mab
C
b
C
b
C
b
qHrptTkybWqHrptTkybW
qHrpTkybWqHrpTkybW
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,0,,,,,,,,0,,,,
111111
111111
>
>>
 
Thus: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cCcCmCcCcbCbCbCb qHrptTkybWqHrpTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,0,,,, 111111111111 >  
 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
(i) For [ ] CmCm tttt >⇒∈ 1, . 
Consider a student denoted 1 with, ( ) ( )
m
kybkyb ,,,, 111 > . 
From the third equilibrium condition, we know that for ( ) ( )
m
kybkyb ,,,, 111 >  we have
C
m
C tt <1 . 
Two situation shall be analyzed: 
1- For CC tt 11ˆ < . 
From figure 3, we know that this student is enrolled in a public school for Ct1 . We can 
write: tttt Cm
CC <<< 11ˆ . Since indirect utility is decreasing in the tax rate for all students with 
( ) ( )
miii kybkyb ,,,, > over the interval [ ]1,Cmt ; student 1 prefers the lowest tax rate over the 
interval which is C
mt . 
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2- For CC tt 11ˆ > . 
From figure 3, we know that this student is enrolled in a private school for Ct1  ( Ct1 is the tax 
rate that maximizes his utility in a public school). Since indirect utility (in a private school) is 
decreasing in the tax rate for all students in the economy; student 1 prefers the lowest tax rate 
over the interval which is Cmt .
21
 
Over the interval [ ]1,Cmt , there does not exist a tax rate different than Cmt that is preferred by more 
than 50% of the population.22 
 
(ii) For [ ] CmCmCm ttttt <⇒∈ ,ˆ , consider an individual with ( ) ( )mkybkyb ,,,, 111 < . 
As indirect utility is increasing over this interval, individual 1 is going to choose the highest 
attainable tax rate over the interval, thus he chooses Cmt . 
Over the interval [ ]CmCm tt ,ˆ , there does not exist a tax rate different than Cmt that is preferred by 
more than 50% of the population.23 
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
We have to demonstrate that over the interval [ ]Cmtˆ,0 , there does not exist a tax rate different 
than Cmt  that is preferred by more than 50% of the population. For a student 1 
with ( ) ( )
m
kybkyb ,,,, 111 <  we have two situations to analyze corresponding to the intervals 
[ ]Ct1ˆ,0  and [ ]CmC tt ˆ,ˆ1 . 
 
1- Over the interval [ ]Ct1ˆ,0 . 
As indirect utility is decreasing in the tax rate over the interval [ ]Ct1ˆ,0 , student 1 prefers a zero 
tax rate in a private school or a school (private or mixed finance) outside his community 
(noted b), over any other tax rate t in the same school. With [ ]Ctt 1ˆ,0∈ . 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]bmCmbCbbmCmbCb qHrptTkybWqHrpTkybW ,,,,,,,,,,,,0,,,, 111111 > .  
                                               
21
 See the remark on page 17. 
22
 The second and third equilibrium conditions are essential to the proof. 
23
 The third equilibrium condition is essential to the proof. 
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In Lemma 4 we have provided the proof that if 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
am
C
ma
C
am
C
macm
C
mc
C
m
C
cm
C
mc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, > is true,24 all students 
with ( ) ( )
miii kybkyb ,,,, < have the same behavior, such as: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]bCbCbCbcCcCmCcCc qHrpTkybWqHrptTkybW ,,,,0,,,,,,,,,,,, 111111111111 > . Student 1 prefers a 
positive tax rate in a public school over a zero tax rate in a private school or a school (private 
or mixed finance) outside his community.  
Thus, student 1 prefers the tax rate Cmt  over the interval [ ]Ct1ˆ,0 . 
 
2- Over the interval [ ]CmC tt ˆ,ˆ1 . 
Indirect utility is increasing in the tax rate over this interval; Cmt  is higher than any other tax 
rate [ ]CmC ttt ˆ,ˆ1∈ , thus individual 1 prefers Cmt  over any other tax rate. 
By Lemma 4 and proposition 2, we find that there does not exist a tax rate different than Cmt  
that is preferred by more than 50% of the population. Cmt is a majority voting equilibrium. 
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